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Since the Asian crisis it has been recognized that exchange rate and monetary policy 
strategies must involve a “fairly high” element of flexibility rather than a single-minded 
defense of a particular rate. One way this flexibility might be introduced is by a 
country adopting an open economy inflation targeting arrangement. This particular 
policy regime has been officially implemented in several Asian countries in recent 
years, but the normative implications of inflation targeting appear at times to be at 
odds with the requirements regarding exchange rate flexibility. This paper presents 
an analysis of some of the issues relevant to Asian central banks implementing an 
inflation targeting arrangement with specific focus on the role of the exchange rate.  
 
 
Key words:   Asia, exchange rate regime, inflation targeting arrangement, fear of 
floating, monetary policy rule, pass through 
 
 
   2
1. Introduction 
An immediate lesson that many observers appear to have drawn from recent 
financial crises in emerging market economies in the 1990s is that the only viable 
exchange rate option boils down to one between flexibility, on the one hand, and 
“credible pegging”, on the other. According to this view, emerging economies have to 
gravitate to these two extremes. Any currency arrangement that lies in between 
these polar extremes or corners (i.e. those in the “middle”) is viewed as being 
inherently unstable and crisis-prone. However, there are many instances where 
intermediate regimes might well be “more appropriate” than corner solutions (for 
instance, see Fischer, 2001, Frankel, 1999 and Willett, 2002). Indeed, the supposed 
bipolar view of exchange rates ought to be presented as a choice between a hard 
peg versus a “more flexible regime” rather than a flexible exchange rate regime per 
se.
1 The latter option implies the absence of any explicit exchange rate target, i.e. 
intervention should not be framed primarily in terms of defending a particular 
exchange rate target. Such targets inevitably tempt speculators by offering them the 
infamous one-way option.  
Exchange rate and monetary policy strategies must therefore involve a “fairly 
high” element of flexibility rather than a single-minded defense of a particular rate. 
One way this flexibility might be achieved is via a band-basket-crawl or BBC regime, 
                                                 
1 As Fischer (2001) notes: 
proponents of what is now known as the bipolar view...probably have 
exaggerated their point for dramatic effect. The right statement is that for 
countries open to international capital flows: (i) pegs are not sustainable 
unless they are very hard indeed; but (ii) that a wide variety of flexible rate 
arrangements are possible; and (iii) that it is to be expected that policy in 
most countries will not be indifferent to exchange rate movements. To put the 
point graphically, if exchange rate arrangements lie along a line connecting 
free floating on the left with currency boards, dollarization or currency union 
on the right, the intent was not to remove everything but the corners, but 
rather to pronounce as unsustainable a segment of that line representing a 
variety of soft pegging exchange rate arrangements.  This formulation 
accommodates all three of the above positions. For countries open to capital 
flows, it leaves open a wide range of arrangements running from free floating 
to a variety of crawling bands with wide ranges, and then very hard pegs 
sustained by a highly credible policy commitment, notably currency boards 
and the abandonment of a national currency. 
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whereby a country loosely targets its trade-weighted or effective exchange rate.
2 
Another possible manner of introducing greater exchange rate flexibility is for a 
country to adopt an open economy inflation targeting arrangement.
3  
 
2.  What is an Inflation Targeting Arrangement? 
Buoyed by the apparent success of inflation targeting (IT) in industrial 
countries in the early 1990s, it has been advocated by the IMF and others as a viable 
policy option for emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere.
4 Since the Asian 
financial debacle of 1997-98, four of the five crisis-hit countries -- Korea, Indonesia, 
Thailand and the Philippines -- have instituted monetary policy arrangements 
fashioned around an inflation objective.
5 Each of these countries has passed legal 
and institutional legislations supporting their respective inflation targeting 
arrangements (Table 1).
6  
What exactly is inflation targeting? While definitions vary in the literature, the 
following definition by Mishkin (2000) is consistent with the consensus: 
Inflation targeting is a monetary policy strategy that encompasses five 
main elements: 1) the public announcement of medium-term 
numerical targets for inflation; 2) an institutional commitment to price 
stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals 
are subordinated; 3) an information inclusive strategy in which many 
variables, and not just monetary aggregates or the exchange rate, are 
used for deciding the setting of policy instruments; 4) increased 
transparency of the monetary policy strategy through communication 
with the public and the markets about the plans, objectives, and 
decisions of the monetary authorities; and 5) increased accountability 
                                                 
2 See Rajan and Siregar (2002, 2003) for an analysis and discussion of Singapore’s 
exchange rate policy. 
 
3 The topic of currency basket arrangements for Asia has been extensively dealt with 
elsewhere. For instance, see Bird and Rajan (2002) and Rajan (2002).  
 
4 For a discussion of inflation targeting during IMF structural adjustment programs, see Blejer 
et al. (2001).  
 
5 Malaysia shifted to a rigid US dollar peg in September 1998 but moved to a rather non-
transparent managed float in July 2005. 
 
6 The revised Bank of Korea Act was passed in December 1997 (and revised in April 1998), 
the new bank of Indonesia Act was passed in May 1999 and the Bank of Thailand Act was 
passed in May 2000 (Table 1).   4
of the central bank for attaining its inflation objectives. The list should 
clarify one crucial point about inflation targeting: it entails much more 
than a public announcement of numerical targets for inflation for the 
year ahead. This is important in the context of emerging markets’ 
countries because many of them routinely reported numerical inflation 
targets or objectives as part of the government's economic plan for the 
coming year, and yet their monetary policy strategy should not be 
characterized as inflation targeting, which requires the other four 
elements for it to be sustainable over the medium term (pp.10-7). 
 
      As apparent from Table 1, important features of an inflation target 
arrangement include the definition of what type of inflation is being targeting, the 
inflation target range, the use of exclusion clauses or caveats (i.e. under what 
circumstances the central bank is able to overshoot its target), and the target horizon. 
All of this information needs to be publicly available and fully transparent. 
Inflation targeting is conducted in conjunction with a monetary policy rule 
(MPR). In general terms, the MPR is one element of a strategy employed by the 
central bank as part of its overall monetary policy. The MPR specifies how the 
instrument of monetary policy is to be changed given the characteristics of the macro 
economy and the policy objectives of the central bank. The MPR implicitly assumes 
that the instrument of monetary policy will always react strongly to inflation (or some 
forecast of future inflation). MPRs and inflation targets are different elements of a 
general monetary policy strategy. The MPR provides a guide to the policymaker as to 
how to manipulate the instrument of monetary policy; the inflation target simply 
makes a statement of what the instrument is being ultimately used for.  
More formally, the degree to which a central bank is committed to an inflation 
targeting arrangement can best be assessed by a central bank loss function. 






1 1 + + + = t t t t y E L λ π λ δ        ( 1 )  
   5
where:  π is the domestic inflation rate gap (deviation between forecasted minus 
target) and y refers to the output gap (deviation of forecasted output from its natural 
rate. E is the expectations operator and δ is the discount rate. The policy parameters, 
i.e. those specifying the precise nature of the monetary policy system, λ1 and λ2 are 
the weights placed on estimated inflation and output gaps. The ratio of the two 
parameters provides a summary of the nature of the policy regime. For instance, if λ1 
= 1 and λ2 = 0.5, the central bank can be said to be twice as concerned about 
inflation than output. In the literature, a situation like this (λ1 > λ2 > 0) is referred to as 
“flexible” inflation targeting. Output is secondary to the inflation target, but the weight 
on the output objective prevents excessive volatility in output and delays the 
attainment of the inflation target. If λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0, it is referred to as strict inflation 
targeting where the inflation target is achieved at any cost. In section 4 below, we re-
examine strict versus flexible inflation targeting and take a broader view of the issue. 
   
3.  The Role of Exchange Rate under Inflation Targeting 
3.1  A Simple Model 
Conventionally an inflation targeting arrangement ought to be accompanied 
by a flexible exchange rate, with the interest rate used as the monetary policy 
instrument. It is generally recognized that for small and open economies in Asia and 
elsewhere, fluctuations in the exchange rate can have significant and direct impact 
on the domestic economy. In particular, assuming a significant degree of pass 
through from exchange rate changes to domestic inflation, it has sometimes been 
argued that exchange rate fluctuations ought to be explicitly incorporated in any 
MPR.  We can evaluate this and other issues with the aid of the following simple 
model
7: 
                                                 
7 The model is an open economy IS-LM type setup as in Ball (1999, 2001) and a simplification 
of the model in Svensson (2000).  
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1 3 2 1 1 + + + − − = t t t t t e r y y ε β β β       ( 2 )  
1 2 1 1 + + + Δ − + = t t t t t e y η α α π π       ( 3 )  
t t t r e υ θ + =          ( 4 )  
 
where: r is the real interest rate, e is the real exchange rate (increase = appreciation 
of domestic currency), ε, μ and ν represent demand, inflation and (real) exchange 
rate shocks respectively. Eq. 2 is an open economy IS curve where output is 
determined by its own lag, the real interest rate (the traditional transmitter of policy in 
a closed economy inflation targeting system) and the real exchange rate. Eq. 3 is a 
conventional Phillips relation exhibiting inflation persistence and where output and 
the real exchange rate explain the rate of inflation next period. To be more specific 
about the exchange rate transmission channel in Eqs. 2 and 3, a fall in e (real 
depreciation) leads to higher inflation domestically (pass through) as well as boosts 
net exports and thus output.
8 Eq. 4 is a reduced form relationship between the real 
exchange rate and the real interest rate.   
We can then specify a loss function similar to Eq. 1 where the central bank 
positions its policy instrument to minimize inflation and output deviations next 
period.
9 Given the quadratic nature of Eq. 1 and the linear constraints (Eqs. 2-4), as 
is convention, we can expect the optimal MPR to also be linear and take the following 
form: 
 
  1 − + − + = t e t t y t t e f f y f f r υ π υ π         ( 5 )  
                                                 
8 We abstract from the possibility of contractionary devaluation. See Cavoli and Rajan 
(2005b) and Bird and Rajan (2004).  
  
9 It is widely held in the inflation targeting literature that the target will be met in two periods.  
However, in open economies, the inclusion of the exchange rate in the model (Eq. 2-4) will 
result in the target being potentially met in one period. This accounts for the specification of 
the loss function in Eq. 1. 
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Substituting Eqs. 4 into Eqs. 2 and 3 and re-substituting the resulting 
equations into Eq. 1 and differentiating with respect to rt allows us to derive the 
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where:   γθ β + = A .   
 
3.2  Fear of Floating 
Several observations can be made about the role of the exchange rate. As 
long as the central bank is committed to pursuing monetary policy as specified by the 
loss function in Eq. 1 (i.e. λ1 and λ2 > 0), the optimal rule will suggest that the 
instrument of policy will always react in some way to the real exchange rate even if 
the central bank is a strict output targeter. The key point to recognize here is that it is 
optimal for the central bank to respond to exchange rate movements insofar as any 
exchange rate shock affects its  ability to reach its target. Hence, for an inflation 
targeter the central bank will react to exchange rate shocks in the process of 
achieving the inflation target. This particular behavior by the central bank is 
misinterpreted as exhibiting “fear of floating” (Eichengreen, 2001). Nonetheless, by   8
observing the composition of fv in Eq. 8, it is clear that the reaction of the instrument 
to the exchange rate is not related to fear of floating. Why?  
First, if a central bank were to exhibit a fear of floating, it would follow that the 
exchange rate (real or nominal) would appear in the loss function. We know from Eq. 
1 that it does not. Second, given that there is no fear of floating coefficient in the loss 
function, obviously, one will not appear in the optimal rule. From Eq. 8 we see that fv 
is made up of policy preferences governing inflation and/or output and any feedback 
from the structural model; there is no fear of floating per se.  
However, in open economies where the proportion of traded to non-traded 
goods is relatively high, the use of domestic inflation may not sufficient represent 
price changes of the consumption basket. Instead, the central bank might choose to 






t π ω ωπ π ) 1 ( − + =         ( 1 0 )  
 
where: π
c is CPI inflation, π
c is traded goods inflation and π is domestic inflation as in 
Eq. 3 above. The parameter ω represents the degree of trade openness by reflecting 
the proportion of traded goods in the domestic economy consumption basket. Traded 
goods prices are highly dependent on changes in the exchange rate.  
 
             ( 1 1 )   t
tr
t e Δ − = ρ π
 
where: ρ captures the degree of pass-through to traded goods prices.  
If the central bank targets domestic inflation then the loss function would be 
as given by Eq. 1. However, if the central bank wishes to target CPI inflation the loss 
function becomes: 
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1 * 1 + + + = t
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t t t y E L λ π λ δ




1 1 * 1 + + + + − + Δ = t t t t y e E λ π ω ωρ λ δ
 
where: λ1* represents the central bank preference for targeting CPI inflation. 
From Eq. 12, we can see that a CPI targeting central bank can exhibit some 
additional policy preference to managing exchange rate volatility and that the 
parameters representing openness (ω) and pass-through (ρ) feature significantly in 
the loss function. By making the requisite substitutions and repeating the process 



























β λ α ω λ
+
+ −












β λ α ω ωρ λ
+
+ − +














=         ( 1 6 )  
  
where:  . Eqs. 13-15 are the optimal rule coefficients (f ) ) 1 ( ( 2 α ω ωρθ − + = M
c) for 
CPI inflation targeting. It is apparent that the extent with which exchange rate 
movements permeate through the domestic economy (as captured by ω and ρ) is 
now explicitly captured as part of a central bank’s optimal monetary policy.    
 
3.3  Concerns with Fear of Floating Behavior   10
Despite the ways that the exchange rate can be incorporated into an open 
economy inflation targeting arrangement, there remain significant concerns about 
doing so.  
First, if one attempts to control the inflationary effects of exchange rate 
changes, that effectively implies raising interest rates during periods of exchange rate 
weakness to and vice versa during periods of exchange rate strength, The concern is 
that responding too heavily and frequently to currency movements in the short-term 
could risk transforming the flexible inflation target to a de facto soft currency peg 
which in turn tends to be crisis-prone. This observation may be especially pertinent to 
some Asian economies where there are concerns of a reversion to exchange rate 
based monetary policy regime.
10 Second, insofar as interest rate changes have a 
lagged effect on the economy on the one hand, and pass through from exchange 
rates tends to be fairly immediate on the other, the central bank will have to forecast 
short-term exchange rate movements. This is near impossible to do on a consistent 
basis.  
One way to partially overcome the problem of exchange rate fluctuations on 
inflation is for the central bank to focus on “core” rather than “headline” inflation (the 
former being headline inflation minus food and energy prices).
11 Referring to Table 1, 
one sees that a number of the Asian central banks pursuing inflation targeting 
arrangements are in fact targeting core inflation. The benefit of doing so is that any 
exchange rate fluctuations that directly impact the imported price of foodstuffs and 
energy will be excluded. While targeting of core inflation does not completely offset 
the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on all domestic prices (as a country could be 
importing other goods and there could be a seeping through of non-core price 
                                                 
10 This issue is the focus of Cavoli and Rajan (2005a). 
 
11 For a more detailed discussion of general issues on core inflation in the context of the 
Philippines and other Asian countries, see Monetary Stability Sector, Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas (2005). “Frequently Asked Questions on Core Inflation”, 
www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/2005/faq/inflation.pdf . 
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inflation into overall inflation), it has been seen as a way of addressing the exchange 
rate debate for small and open economies.
12  
While targeting core inflation helps to loosen the tie between exchange rates 
and domestic monetary policy, there is a more basic concern with exchange rate 
movements on the monetary transmission mechanism, viz. what if pass through is 
incomplete such that nominal exchange rate changes do not immediately translate 
into real exchange rate changes? If this happens, it implies that the real exchange 
rate will not revert to its original value (i.e. purchasing power parity will not hold), 
which in turn could impact domestic output, growth and inflation over time. In other 
words, a flexible exchange rate could lead to persistent exchange rate misalignment 
which could be sustained over prolonged periods. Insofar as these exchange rate 
misalignments have sustained impact on the real sector, ought not the central bank 
explicitly incorporate estimated exchange rate misalignments in their policy rule even 
if the focus is on core inflation? While there may be logic for this in principle, in 
practice such a policy is hard to implement effectively as it basically requires that that 
the central bank is able to estimate equilibrium real exchange rates, something which 
is not easy to do so, especially given that the equilibrium real exchange rate could 
fluctuate over time.
13 Does this imply a complete neglect of persistent exchange rate 
or other asset price fluctuations under an inflation targeting arrangement?
14 We turn 
                                                 
12 While core inflation has the advantage of stripping out components that may cause 
idiosyncratic price changes arising from supply shocks, a problem targeting core inflation is 
that it is much harder to communicate the logic of this target to the general public. The public 
is generally not aware of the meaning of core inflation, and if there is a wide gap between 
core and headline inflation, the central bank’s anti-inflationary credibility might be affected. 
 
13 For instance, for a fast growing open economy, the productivity growth in the tradables 
sector generally outpaces the nontradables sector, (so-called “Balassa-Samuelson effect”), 
thus suggesting an appreciation of the country’s equilibrium real exchange rate. For 
discussions of the concept of equilibrium real exchange rates, see the collection of papers in 
Hinkle and Montiel, (1999). 
  
14 For elaborated discussions of the role of exchange rates in inflation targeting 
arrangements, see Eichengreen (2001), Sgherri (2005), and Taylor (2001). For a more formal 
analysis of the role of exchange rates in central bank’s objective function, see Hammermann 
(2003). These issues are explored more formally in Cavoli and Rajan (2005b).  
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to this issue next. 
 
4.  Strict versus Flexible Targeting 
There is a school of thought that argues that as long as the country’s inflation 
outlook remains consistent with the medium term inflation target range (i.e. the policy 
reference period), the central bank has space to use its judgment to judiciously to 
meet other objectives and respond effectively to various shocks and “obvious” asset 
price misalignments in the interim.
15 This suggests a degree of discretion in being 
able to prick “asset price “bubbles” including exchange rate and housing ones (or 
better still, be preemptive so as to prevent bubbles from forming in the first instance). 
However, multiple targeting (over and above inflation and output) is not without its 
drawbacks.  
One, multiplicity of objectives/flexibility in implementing the inflation target 
invariably complicates the communication strategy of the central bank’s monetary 
policy. As Fredric Mishkin (2002) notes: 
The KISS principle (“Keep It Simple Stupid”) suggests that monetary 
policy should be articulated in as simple way as possible. The beauty 
of inflation target regimes is that by focusing on one objective – 
inflation – communication is fairly straightforward (p14).  
 
Two, when monetary authorities explain their monetary policy actions by 
referring to the need to ensure output or exchange rate stability, “the political debate 
about monetary policy is likely to focus on short-run issues”, (Mishkin, 2002, p.11) be 
it job creation, exchange rate stability, or even asset price stability. This in turn may 
“obscure the transparency of monetary policy and make it less likely that the public 
will support a monetary policy that focuses on long-run considerations” (Mishkin, 
2002, p.14) and may worsen the output-inflation tradeoff.   
To be sure, there is a significant difference between keeping an eye on asset 
price changes as offering information on underlying economy versus explicitly 
                                                 
15 One might call this the “Australian view” of inflation targeting. See Debelle (2001).  
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targeting them. The former is rather uncontroversial; the latter is not.
16 There is a 
concern that central banks are not able to estimate bubbles or misalignments 
(wouldn’t they be rich if they could?), and there could also be instances where 
various asset prices give conflicting signals.
17 Ben Bernanke of the Federal Reserve 
has argued strongly against the central bank attempting to respond to asset price 
bubbles. As he notes: 
If we could accurately and painlessly rid asset markets of bubbles, of 
course we would want to do so. But as a practical matter, this is easier 
said than done, particularly if we intend to use monetary policy as the 
instrument, for two main reasons. First, the Fed cannot reliably identify 
bubbles in asset prices. Second, even if it could identify bubbles, 
monetary policy is far too blunt a tool for effective use against 
them….(A)s a society, we would like to find ways to mitigate the 
potential instabilities associated with asset-price booms and busts. 
Monetary policy is not a useful tool for achieving this objective, 
however. Even putting aside the great difficulty of identifying bubbles 
in asset prices, monetary policy cannot be directed finely enough to 
guide asset prices without risking severe collateral damage to the 
economy. A far better approach, I believe, is to use micro-level 
policies to reduce the incidence of bubbles and to protect the financial 
system against their effects. I have already mentioned a variety of 
possible measures, including supervisory action to ensure capital 
adequacy in the banking system, stress testing of portfolios, increased 
transparency in accounting and disclosure practices, improved 
financial literacy, greater care in the process of financial liberalization, 
and a willingness to play the role of lender of last resort when needed. 
(Bernanke, 2002, p 3 and 8)
18
  
Even if there is a case for the central bank to respond to signs of obvious 
bubbles, it probably cannot be incorporated in an explicit rule. If the monetary 
                                                 
16 Similarly, many central banks in Asia and elsewhere also keep an eye on the so-called 
“Monetary Conditions Index” or MCI which is a weighted average of interest rate and 
exchange rate and this is not controversial. If they attempt to explicitly target the MCI it would 
be much more controversial. For discussion of the MCI in the context of Hong Kong, see 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) (2000). 
 
17 Also see Bean (2003). That said, not everyone is convinced by such concerns and offer the 
counterargument that monetary policy needs to be cautious but not “paralyzed”. For instance, 
Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani (2002) have argued:  
(W)e are not persuaded that one should ignore asset price misalignments 
simply because they are difficult to measure. The standard response to noisy 
data is to use econometric methods to extract the signal. This is common 
practice in the use of statistics in a policymaking environment. If central 
bankers threw out all data that was poorly measured, there would be very 
little information left on which to base their decisions (p.19).  
 
18 Also see Bernanke and Gertler (2001).   14
authority chooses to respond to such misalignments infrequently they should do so 
on a discretionary basis. This leads us to the next issue as to whether an inflation 
targeting arrangement errs on the side of policy rigidity and discipline or discretion 
and flexibility? While the exact balance between flexibility and rigidity will no doubt 
vary between countries (and possibly over time within a country), broad rules of 
thumb suggest: (a) the less credible the central bank (i.e. poorer its inflation-fighting 
track record); (b) the less its technical ability; and (c) the lower its political 
independence, the more advisable it is to pre-commit to a “strict” or “hard” inflation 
target (i.e. preference of a rule over discretion).  
 
5. Conclusion 
In the final analysis, regardless of the degree of flexibility or discretion that is 
desired, it is imperative that the central bank operating a flexible inflation targeting 
arrangement communicate effectively to the public the lexicographic ordering of its 
objectives and the time frame over which the central bank is committed to returning 
inflation to target. The central bank needs to be publicly committed to relinquish all 
other goals in order to meet the inflation target.  
The inflation targeters in Asia have thus far not faced significant tradeoffs 
between inflation and other objectives in view of the fact that the global economic 
environment has, until recently, been non-inflationary. In other words, given that 
inflation has never really threatened to overshoot its predetermined band, many of 
the Asian central banks have been largely free to use monetary policy to attain other 
goals such as smoothing exchange rate changes.  Put another way, to date the 
credibility of the system has not been seriously challenged. Many Asian inflation 
targeting central banks appear to take into account exchange rate movements – 
whether by targeting CPI inflation or by possessing some exchange rate objective 
over and above that implicitly given by CPI inflation targeting as described in section 
3. It would appear though, that there is an asymmetry in the way that central banks   15
treat exchange rate movements. Specifically, they do not always alter interest rates 
in response to upward (buying) pressure on their currencies, preferring to intervene 
in the foreign exchange market and accumulate reserves, but they are more willing to 
hike interest rates (or use other measures such as tightening capital controls) in the 
midst of downward (selling) pressure on their currencies. This in turn inevitably has 
led to a rapid stockpiling of international reserves which have had to be sterilized so 
as to prevent a domestic monetary overhang. 
   16
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Table 1 
Highlights of Inflation Targeting Arrangements in Selected Asian Economies (as of July 2005) 
 











Accountability  Target set by  Publication 
and 
accountability 
Indonesia  May 1999  Headline CPI 
 
5 – 6%  3 years  none  None, but 
parliament can 
request reports 





Inflation report,  
Annual report to 
public 










4 – 6%  2 years  Yes, in the 



















Thailand  Apr 2000  Core CPI 
(excluding 
fresh food and 
energy) 
0 – 3.5 %  Indefinite  None  Public 
explanation of 
breach and 
steps taken to 
address it 
 




































     Source: Compiled by authors from Bank of Korea, Bank Indonesia, Bank of Thailand, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas website  6
 